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Provision of quality tertiary education is an important determinant of economic growth and 
development (Barro 2000, Aghion et al. 2005).  
 
One of the biggest policy challenges is to decide how to expand access to tertiary education- by 
direct  provision  or  by  contracting  out  to  private  providers  and  introducing  need-and-merit 
based scholarships? 
 
Governments in many developing countries directly provide tertiary education to make tertiary 
education accessible to greater number of students, and to have better control over the quality 
of provision. Private providers are often criticized for inferior quality of provision, as it is feared 
that they  compromise  the quality  due to  their  market  incentives to  reduce  costs.  In  many 
developing countries, public colleges are more prestigious. Public college graduates outperform 
graduates  of  private  ones  on  the  college  exit  exams  and  earn  more  than  private  college 
graduates. This has often been attributed to the cutting edge education provided in public 
colleges  and  perceived  as  an  evidence  for  lower  value-added  by  the  private  institutions, 
reflecting their incentives to maximize profits rather than improve quality. This makes a strong 
case for increasing public college infrastructure through direct provision. 
 
However, public colleges are highly subsidized, suggesting that the private-public education 
outcome gap might reflect the pre-determined quality of the students who sort into public 
colleges rather than the causal impact of the public tertiary education on students’ outcomes. 
While this is attributed to the value-added by the public colleges, little is known about whether 
or not the public colleges actually add value.  
 This  paper  evaluates  the  differential  impact  of  public  colleges  on  students'  educational 
achievements in the context of India. 
 
Admission to public colleges in India is based on the results of the Senior Secondary School 
examinations (the equivalent of high school exit exams). Also, the exit exams taken at the 
undergraduate level are identical (by field of education and University of affiliation) across 
private and public colleges. We take advantage of this to evaluate the value added of public 
colleges on students' educational outcomes using a Regression Discontinuity Design.  
 
We assemble a unique data set that links admission data reflecting students' entry quality with 
their  educational  outcomes,  measured  by  the  performance  on  the  common  exit  exams. 
Consistent with previous studies we find that the exit scores of the student's graduating from 
public colleges are significantly higher than those of their private counterparts. However, once 
we  account  for  self-selection  into  public  and  private  colleges,  by  comparing,  in  the 
neighborhood of the admission cutoff scores, those students just above the threshold with 
their peers just below the threshold we find that public colleges have no added value at this 
margin. Furthermore, controlling for entry scores, we find no differences between the exit 
outcomes of students graduating from public and private colleges.  
 
Our findings stand in contrast to the stylized view that public colleges outcomes are better due 
to value added. The private-public observed quality gap reflects that better students sort into 
the less expensive prestigious colleges, rather than a causal impact of public colleges on tertiary 
educational outcomes.  
 Do Public Colleges in Developing Countries Provide Better 
Education than Private ones? 
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Provision of quality tertiary education is an important determinant of economic growth
and development (Barro 2000, Aghion et al. 2005). Economists have also identiﬁed pos-
itive externalities associated with tertiary education (Moretti 2004). As a result, there is
a widespread concern over quality of tertiary education provision. Governments in many
developing countries directly provide tertiary education to make tertiary education accessi-
ble to greater number of students, and to have better control over the quality of provision.
Private providers are often criticized for inferior quality of provision, as it is feared that they
compromise the quality due to their market incentives to reduce costs.1 In many developing
countries, public colleges are more prestigious, and their graduates have better outcomes.
While this is attributed to the value-added by the public colleges, little is known about
whether or not the public colleges actually add value.
Our paper aims to evaluate the diﬀerential impact of public colleges on students’ edu-
cational achievements in the context of India. The remarkable economic transformation of
India into a high-powered center of Information technology, which has been built on a large
pool of high-quality highly educated workers, suggests that the expansion of high quality
tertiary education is essential for the robust growth of India’s economy. While the govern-
ment wants to expand access, it also directly provides college education due to concerns over
quality erosion by private providers.
Entry into tertiary education in India is highly regulated.The University Grant Commis-
sion Act prohibits any institution from awarding degrees unless it is established under an
act of Parliament or is especially empowered to award degrees. A recent state reform that
allowed private universities to operate and provide tertiary education was overturned by
India’s Supreme Court in a decision that led to the de-recognition of 112 private universities
on quality grounds.2 This resonates with the state skepticism about market oriented ter-
tiary education sector to provide high quality tertiary education. One of the biggest policy
challenges is to decide how to expand access to tertiary education- by direct provision or
by contracting out to private providers and introducing need-and-merit based scholarships?
Public colleges in India, as in many developing countries, are perceived as more prestigious
and on the average, students graduating from public colleges in India have better educational
1Levy (2008,a and b) provide detailed discussion.
2The state of Chhattisgarh allowed the establishment of private universities under the Chhattisgarh
Private Sector University (Establishment & Regulation) Act, 2002. But the Supreme Court declared as null
and void the establishment of 112 private universities that emerged under this law. The decision is available
at http://www.ugc.ac.in/inside/supremecourt.pdf
1outcomes than their private counterparts.3 This is validated in our sample as well (Figure I).
In a pilot survey of college graduates, we ﬁnd that public college graduates have higher av-
erage earnings than private college graduates. The distribution of earnings by college type is
shown in Appendix Figure A.1. As a result, the public-private gap in educational outcomes
is often perceived as evidence for lower value-added by the private institutions, reﬂecting
their incentives to maximize proﬁts rather than improve quality. This makes a strong case
for increasing public college infrastructure through direct provision.
However, public colleges are highly subsidized for the sake of providing equitable access
to higher education. Given that the average students from public colleges performs better
in educational outcomes than the average students from a private colleges, and their wages
seem to be higher on the average, students take this as a noisy signal about value-added
of the public colleges. The prestigious public colleges are also much cheaper. Therefore,
the private-public educational outcome gap might reﬂect the pre-determined quality of the
students sorting into public colleges, rather than the eﬀect of the public college attendance on
students’ outcomes. This paper aims to evaluate the value-added of public tertiary education
in India.
Admission to public colleges in India is based on the results of the Senior Secondary School
examinations (the equivalent of high school exit exams). 4 Also, the exit exams taken at the
undergraduate level are identical (by ﬁeld of education and University of aﬃliation) across
private and public colleges. We take advantage of this to identify the value added of public
colleges on students’ educational outcomes using a Regression Discontinuity Design. We
establish a unique data set that links admission data reﬂecting students’ entry quality with
their educational outcomes, measured by the performance on the common exit exams. While
passing these exams is required for graduation, performance on these exit scores inﬂuences
admission to graduate educational programs, access to scholarships, and qualifying for most
jobs.5 We ﬁnd that the exit scores of the student’s graduating from public colleges are
signiﬁcantly higher than those of their private counterparts. However, once we account for
3See (Powar and Bhalla, 2008) for example. This is true of other developing countries as well. Except for
a few elite private institutions of higher education, public institutions share a higher prestige than private
ones (Gupta, 2005).
4Professional colleges and a few elite private colleges usually conduct an entrance exam to select students.
However, country wide admissions into colleges for general education are governed by marks obtained in class
XII Senior Secondary School exams.
5Some examples can be found at the following URLS:
http://www.winentrance.com/Indian Institute of technology/Delhi/IIT Delhi Admissions PH D
Programmes.html,http://www.amity.edu/scholarships/, http://www.licindia.com/pages/aao
generalist ca actuarial.pdf
2self-selection into these colleges, using a Regression Discontinuity Design framework, we ﬁnd
that public colleges have no added value at the margin. Controlling for entry scores, we ﬁnd
no diﬀerences between the exit outcomes of students graduating from public and private
colleges. Our ﬁndings stand in contrast to the stylized view that public colleges outcomes
are better due to value added. The private-public observed quality gap reﬂects that better
students sort into the less expensive prestigious colleges, rather than a causal impact of
public colleges on tertiary educational outcomes.
Our study complements the literature examining the costs and beneﬁts of public versus
private provision of public services. We make two contributions to the existing literature.
6 First, we examine whether public tertiary educational institutions produce better trained
college graduates in the context of a developing country. This question is of signiﬁcant policy
relevance from public ﬁnance point of view. Second, our unique data set in which we match
college admission data to college exit scores, allows us to employ a regression discontinuity
design to evaluate the value-added eﬀect of public versus private providers of a public service.
Our paper is the ﬁrst study to shed light on the value-added of public versus private tertiary
education institutions in a developing country setting.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We provide the institutional background
in section 2, and the theoretical framework in section 3. The data we use in our analysis
is discussed in section 4. Section 5 describes our empirical strategy. Section 6 provides the
main results, while section 7 compares the cost of education at public and private colleges.
We describe the results of our robustness checks in section 8. We conclude by discussing
policy recommendations in section 9.
2 Institutional background
India’s Economy and Growth of Higher Education
India has experienced tremendous growth in recent years, which has been attributed to its
vast pool of highly educated workers. In 2003, the service sector contributed approximately
47 percent of the GDP, followed by the industrial sector’s contribution of 24 percent. This
is in stark contrast to only a half century earlier, as Indian economy was largely agricultural
6Various studies have tried to address the private versus public school eﬃcacy using vouchers (see Angrist
et al (2002) for detailed references). Some recent studies have addressed the quality diﬀerence between private
and public elementary schools in South Asia (Kingdon, 1996; Das, Pandey and Zajonc, 2006) and concluded
that the private schools outperform public schools. But surprisingly, not much research has focused on
tertiary education even though tertiary education has improved growth prospects in places like India and
Ireland.
3as recently as 1950. Tertiary education especially technology-oriented training, feeds the
current boom of business process out-sourcing to India. The high rate of growth in the
service sector has had a feedback eﬀect on demand for tertiary education. While the number
of colleges has steadily increased since India’s independence in 1947, it was only in the 1990s
that the number of colleges saw a dramatic rise.7 The enrollment ﬁgures also show a similar
trend. General education college enrollment spurted in the post-reform decades. Although
the demand for higher education is on the rise, only 7-9 percent of the college-age population
enrolls in tertiary education institutions.
Overview of Public and Private Institutions of Tertiary Education in India
While there are no formal private universities in India in the general education sector as of
2005, there are a large number of private colleges oﬀering general and technical education.8
Each college has its own campus and infrastructure. Private colleges are managed privately,
though they may receive public funds (“private aided college”) or may be totally self ﬁnanced
(“private unaided college”). The private aided colleges can raise funds by charging higher
fees and accepting donations from philanthropic or business groups. On the other hand,
public colleges are managed and ﬁnanced by the government. Public colleges cannot accept
any private donations, and the state funds their maintenance and development expenses.9
Although, the teachers have to take the same University Grants Commission Exam to qualify
for teaching positions in private colleges, they do not enjoy the same degree of job security
as the government teachers. Their contracts diﬀer from college to college and are negotiated
with the private management. Private colleges also hire more adjunct teachers on short term
contracts than public colleges. In contrast, public colleges are managed and run by state
employees. Teacher contracts are negotiated with the government and oﬀer tenure security.
Facilities and equipment are funded by the state in public colleges, but private colleges (both
aided and un-aided) have to self ﬁnance these kinds of expenditures. Any government aid
can only be applied to teachers salaries by the private aided colleges.
7The higher education system in India grew rapidly after Independence. By 1980, there were 132 uni-
versities and 4738 colleges in the country enrolling around ﬁve per cent of the eligible age group in higher
education. The pace of growth in number of institutions accelerated after the economic reforms that com-
menced in 1991. Today, India is the third largest higher education system in the world in terms of enrollment
(after China and the USA), and it is the largest higher education system in the world in terms of number of
institutions. The number of institutions of higher education in India is more than four times the combined
number of institutions both in the United States and all of Europe (Agarwal, 2006).
8Although these colleges are a private initiative, they are not recognized as “for- proﬁt businesses”.
9In our sample, the private aided colleges receive public funds to meet their recurring expenditures (mostly
teacher salaries) and charge much higher tuition than the government colleges.
4Since Independence, the government of India has put considerable emphasis on equitable
access to higher education as an important policy goal and has subsidized higher education
accordingly. To implement this subsidy, government colleges charge only a nominal fee for
attending such institutions. Among the colleges in our sample (in 2005), private institutions
charged about 5-6 times more than the public colleges in tuition. 10 The admission to public
colleges is strictly based on merit. However, beneﬁciaries of aﬃrmative action also attend
public colleges under a system of reservation of seats for marginalized groups i.e., scheduled
castes. The merit criterion used for these groups tends to diﬀer than the one used for general
category non-reserved seats.
Regulations in India’s Tertiary Education and Admission into Public Colleges
Tertiary education sector in India is highly regulated. In this section, we highlight features
of the educational system in India that will be used in our identiﬁcation strategy.
Identical Exit Tests for Private and Public Colleges
An important feature of the education system is that the power to grant degrees is vested
with the universities.11 Independent colleges are not allowed to confer a degree on their
own accord.12 These colleges have to aﬃliate with a university in order to operate. As a
result, all students in colleges (private or public) aﬃliated with the same university, take
the same exit exams. These exams vary by ﬁeld of study, but conditional on the ﬁeld,
private and public college students are exposed to the same curriculum and take the same
exam. These exams test for language competencies( English and regional language) and ﬁeld
speciﬁc competencies, for example commerce students take tests in accounting, taxation etc.
The examinations for the aﬃliated colleges are conducted by the respective universities,
which also set the course curriculum. The aﬃliated colleges only oﬀer prescribed courses of
study. Thus, conditional on university and ﬁeld aﬃliation, we can compare the educational
outcomes of students in public and private colleges as they take the same exit tests.
Admission to Public Colleges
Admission to all public colleges in the general education sector, namely all ﬁelds of education
except professional colleges such as those dedicated to medicine, is solely determined on the
10The fee structure is available from the college brochures.
11The University Grant Commission Act (UGC), which is the government body that regulates tertiary
education, has a provision that prohibits any institution from awarding degrees unless it is established under
an act of Parliament or is specially empowered to award degrees.
12The colleges account for about nine-tenths of undergraduate enrollments (Agarwal, 2006)
5basis of the results of the Senior Secondary School examinations taken in class XII.13 All
high schools in India must be aﬃliated either with one of the two national boards (Central
Board of Secondary Education or Indian Certiﬁcate of Secondary Education) or with their
state’s regional board. The exit exams are conducted by school boards across India and
are recognized nationally. Students cannot be admitted to college without at least passing
this exam, but in order to be admitted to public colleges, their score needs to exceed a
speciﬁed cutoﬀ. This admission cutoﬀ for public colleges is determined every year and varies
by gender and area of study. It also varies by caste as part of the aﬃrmative action policy.
Students who score above the cutoﬀ are eligible for admission to public colleges. While a
list of students who are invited to take admission in public colleges is announced (posted
by colleges), the admission cutoﬀs are unknown to the public. To account for diﬀerences in
Senior Secondary School exams (high school exit exams) across aﬃliating boards, the college
admission committees implicitly standardize exam scores of applicants from other boards
than the regional ones.14 The formulae for standardizing and determining the admission
cutoﬀ are not public knowledge. These rules are conﬁdential information even ex-post.
Students apply to various colleges simultaneously as the admissions open in Spring. The
admission decisions are made public in early Fall shortly before the start of the academic
year.
3 Theoretical Framework
There is considerable debate about when government should provide services and institutions
such as prisons, hospitals, ﬁre departments, and educational institutions and when should
these be contracted out to private providers. Economists have addressed this issue both
theoretically and empirically. Advocates of private provision point out that the private
providers deliver public goods at a lower cost than the government. Also, there are agency
problems and incentive design issues. The public employees have little at stake in the service
provision, and hence do not exert any eﬀort to deliver quality service. Additionally, a lack of
accountability results from unconditional job security, and non-merit criterion like seniority
for promotion of public employees. In contrast, critics stress that private providers would cut
quality to achieve lower costs, and hence the quality of public services provided by private
suppliers would be inferior to those provided by public employees.
Theoretically, the choice of contracting services out versus providing them in-house has
been investigated in the framework of incomplete contracts. Hart et al (1997) developed
13Class XII is equivalent to a high school grade 12, the last year of high school.
14Both public colleges reported standardizing the scores using a formula.
6a framework to demonstrate that private providers under certain circumstances can deliver
higher quality services than the public employees.In the same vein, Besley and Ghatak (2001)
show that if contracts are incomplete, then contracting out to non-proﬁts can be preferred
especially for social goods that non-proﬁts value. In case of tertiary education, this choice
is not clear ex ante. Since students choose which institution to attend, private colleges
have a strong incentive to provide higher quality education in order to compete. At the
same time, unless the education is paid for by the government, as is the case in voucher
arrangements in schools, the private colleges would also have an incentive to reduce costs.
As a result, if incentives to reduce costs outweigh quality improvement, then the quality of
provision can be undermined. Thus, the public employees whose incentives are more aligned
with the government might provide better service. To our knowledge, no empirical study
addresses this question in the context of tertiary education. Moreover, this issue is even
more pertinent in a developing country setting where a robust tertiary education sector can
accelerate economic growth (Aghion et al, 2005), which can lead to trickle-down beneﬁts
that improve standards of living.15
In India, there is intense debate about whether government should provide tertiary educa-
tion.16 While the expansion of high quality tertiary education is essential for the continued
robust growth of the Indian economy, the existing infrastructure is not able to meet the
demand for college graduates. From a policy perspective, whether the government should
expand the public college system or contract higher education out to private providers,
remains an open question. In this paper, we attempt to address whether public colleges
operated by public employees provide better quality of services than private providers in the
context of the general college education in India.
Our ﬁndings also complement a set of studies that examine the payoﬀ of attending a
more selective college(Dale and Krueger, 2001; Behrman et al, 1996). Since the unobserved
characteristics of students might inﬂuence both college admissions and later outcomes such
as performance in college or post- college earnings, it is diﬃcult to disentangle the eﬀect
of going to a more selective college from student’s pre-college characteristics. A number of
approaches including siblings ﬁxed eﬀects, and matching methods, and more recently regres-
15The issue of private versus public provision of other services in developing countries, such as drinking
water and health, has been addressed in some recent papers. Galiani et al (2005) studied the eﬀect of
privatization of water services in Argentina and found that child mortality fell by 8 % in areas that privatized.
Bloom et al (2006) studied the eﬀects of contracting out management of government health services to NGOs
in Cambodia. While targeted outcomes (like receipt of vitamins by children) improved signiﬁcantly, there is
limited evidence that the program improved self-reported health of the residents of districts where services
were managed privately.
16See Gupta (2005) for a good background on the subject.
7sion discontinuity design (Hoekstra, 2010 ; Saavendra , 2009) have been used to address this
issue.17 The public colleges in India however are distinct. These are considered more presti-
gious, but they also reserve 25 percent of the seats for marginalized groups who enter college
based on a much lower admission cutoﬀ. Hence, these colleges are not highly selective in the
strict sense. But it is worthwhile to highlight other features of our study that distinguish
it from these other papers. Unlike Hoekstra (2010), with our data, we are able to examine
the college educational outcomes of the students. This helps us to assess the value added
by the college. Moreover, we are comparing the outcomes of students graduating from pub-
lic and private institutions, whereas Hoekstra(2010) compares the labor market outcomes
of students who attend a ﬂagship American university to those who are denied admission.
These students may or may not have attended another college. In our setting, students have
to take the college exit exams to graduate, unlike Saavendra (2009) where the exit test is
optional. Therefore, in our study there is no selection into taking the exit tests. The most
important diﬀerence is that our paper sheds light on the value-added by public institutions
relative to private ones. In developing countries, where resources are scarce, a very impor-
tant public ﬁnance agenda is to understand the eﬃcacy of subsidized public goods provision
by government agencies. None of these other papers shed light on the relative value-added
of public colleges relative to private ones.
Attending prestigious colleges can inﬂuence later life outcomes of the students like labor
market participation, and wages. This can be on account of (i) better human capital pro-
duction in colleges, (ii) networking or (iii) screening by employers(Epple and Romano, 1998;
Macleod and Uriquola, 2010). In this paper, we demonstrate that atleast the ﬁrst channel
does not seem to be operating, and there does not seem to be signiﬁcant value added by the
public colleges. It is worth noting that attending public colleges can have positive eﬀect on
post-college earnings in spite of no value-added due to these other mechanisms.18 We aim
to explore this by complementing our data with survey evidence in future work.
17Regression Discontinuity Design has been used for evaluating returns to attending selective k-12 schools
and understanding the eﬀects of tracking (Damon, 2010; Pop-Eleches and Urquiola(2009); Dupas et al, 2010).
See Dupas et al(2010) for references and discussion.
18In the Indian context, the public colleges are prestigious but also reserve signiﬁcant proportion of seats
for lower caste students who enter colleges with lower scores on the average. Hence, information channel
where employers screen on college type may not operate as expected.
84 Data
Data sources
Our estimates are based on a unique data set that we assembled from admissions records
and university exam results of four general education colleges in a district in India. The
admission records from two private and two public colleges for the academic years 1998-99
to 2002-03 were obtained and were matched to the university examination results from the
‘Result Gazettes’ for the respective years.
Selection of Colleges
Typically, all the colleges in a particular district are aﬃliated with the same university.19 As a
result, all the students in the district take the same exams in order to graduate from college.
We restricted our choice of sample colleges to the district headquarter. This is an urban
area with a population of over one million, according to the 2001 Census of India. There are
two public colleges and 10 private colleges in the district headquarters all aﬃliated with the
same university.20 The colleges are either exclusively for men or for women. Among the two
public colleges, one is for women and the other is for men. There are 7 private colleges for
women and 3 for men in the district headquarters. While all the women’s colleges receive
some degree of ﬁnancial support from the state government which varies across colleges, 1 of
the 3 men’s colleges is an unaided private college, i.e. it receives no support from the state
government. We obtained the admission records for both the public colleges and selected one
women’s and one men’s private aided college within 5 kilometers of the public colleges.21 This
was done to ensure that transportation costs did not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the choice between
these colleges. The variables reported in the admission records include date of birth, gender,
medium of instruction in senior secondary school, board of Secondary School examination
22 , marks obtained in the senior secondary board exams, place of residence (rural or urban)
, father’s occupation, and income.23
19District is the administrative unit below the state. There are three universities that oﬀer general edu-
cation in the state and the colleges aﬃliate with a university largely based on geographical proximity to the
university.
20There are other institutions also called colleges, which confer a diploma and are typically not recognized
by the university. A diploma is not considered equivalent to a degree for purposes of admission to higher
education institutions or for applying for jobs.
21Within the 5 KM radius, there are 2 men’s private colleges and 3 women’s private colleges.
22The Secondary School exams are administered by examination boards which can be national or regional.
23The major boards in the data include the regional School Education Board and Central Board of Sec-
ondary Education. Almost 80 % of the sample is from the regional board.Women’s public college does not
9The marks obtained in the college exit exams are reported in the university wide ’Result
Gazette’. Each student who takes the university exam is assigned a unique roll number.
These gazettes, with results for each student listed under a roll number, are available from
the university. We obtained these for the 5 years in our sample. These were then matched
to individual student admission records in the colleges. For the purposes of our analysis,
we look at the overall composite score obtained in the college degree program, which is the
accumulated total of the scores on each of three annual exams administered to students
during their undergraduate program.
In order to verify that the private colleges in our sample are similar to other private
colleges, we compare the educational outcomes of private colleges in our sample to others
in the same district headquarters. The left panel in Appendix Figure A.2 shows that the
densities of college exit tests (for academic year 2009-2010) for in-sample private colleges are
similar to those for other private colleges in the same district headquarters. Our sample is
from a single district. We therefore compare the educational outcomes of the private colleges
in our sample to those from a neighboring district headquarters (Right Panel, Figure A.2),
and in-sample public colleges to those in a neighboring district (Figure A.3). The densities
are very similar. These comparisons provide assurance that we are not comparing best
private colleges to worst public colleges, and that our results are likely to hold in other
settings as well.
Main Micro Sample
Our main micro sample is taken from admission records of private and public colleges for
admissions years 1998 to 2002. The cutoﬀs vary by year, gender, and ﬁeld of education.
We normalized individuals’ entry scores by taking deviations from each groups’ admissions
cutoﬀs. Exit exams also vary by ﬁeld of education. Therefore, our main sample focuses
on individuals admitted and graduated in Liberal Arts, the most popular ﬁeld of study in
India. 24 We exclude observations with missing entry or exit exam scores. We have 3,394
observations in the ﬁnal sample of college graduates. This sample also excludes students
admitted on aﬃrmative action reservation. Data appendix provides more details on the
sample generation. Appendix table A.3 provides overall summary statistics.
record father’s income .
24According to UGC statistics cited in Gupta (2005) about 45 percent of all enrolled students in higher
education in 2002-2003 were in Liberal Arts.This is also reﬂected in our data where about 63 percent of our
main sample graduated from Liberal Arts.
10Public-Private Educational Outcomes Gap
The “eﬀect” of public colleges on educational outcomes
The graduates of the public colleges on average do far better than their private counterparts
on their college exit examinations, suggesting that public colleges do outperform private
colleges. This holds for both genders as well as for all ﬁelds of study by year. For the sake
of brevity, we demonstrate these diﬀerences using our main sample focusing on Liberal Arts
students. This sample includes students from 5 cohorts, from both genders, one ﬁeld of
study, and admitted on the non-reserved category seats. Figure I sketches the college exit
exams scores for men and women separately for the main ﬁeld of study in our sample. As
Figure I demonstrates, the average scores in the college exit exams for students at public
colleges are consistently higher for 9 out of 10 gender-year cells. Between 1998 and 2002, the
average exit scores of men and women graduating from a public colleges, were 0.5 standard
deviations higher than the average exit scores of their private college counterparts. However,
the exit score gap might reﬂect pre-determined diﬀerences in the academic quality of these
students rather than the reduced form impact of public college on students’ educational
achievement.
Diﬀerences in Pre-Characteristics among Public and Private College
Students
Table I reports summary statistics of the pre-determined characteristics of the students by
type of college for all years, all ﬁelds of study , and both genders pooled together. We ﬁnd
that public college students have better family and social backgrounds than their private
college counterparts, and they perform better on common high school cognitive achievement
exams. Hence, public-private comparisons do not provide a valid treatment-comparison
setting for evaluating the impact of public college added value on educational achievements,
and that the observed gap in exit exam scores might reﬂect other pre-determined factors
rather than the value-added by public colleges.
5 Estimation of the Causal Eﬀect of Public Colleges on
Students’ Scholarly Achievements
Let Yi denote a student i’s college exist score. Let Pi be a binary variable that is equal to 1 if
the i is student is enrolled in a public college and zero otherwise. For the sake of simplicity,
let us assume that outcomes can be approximated by the following linear form:
11Yi = X
0
iβ + γPi + Ui, (1)
where X is a set of other observed variables assumed to aﬀect exist scores, and γ is
the average impact of public colleges on the students’ exit scores. The disturbance term
Ui represents unobservable factors inﬂuencing outcomes. We want to estimate the eﬀect of
attending public colleges on the college educational outcome. We want to isolate γ, which
is the treatment eﬀect of attending public colleges in our speciﬁcation.
The OLS estimates of γ would be biased due to omitted student’s characteristics like
innate ability that may inﬂuence both admission into public colleges, and the educational
outcomes in exit exams. To avoid the pitfalls associated with omitted student characteristics,
we make use of the fact that the admission into public colleges is a deterministic function of
the class XII Senior Secondary School examinations (high school equivalent) test scores (S),
and estimate γ in a Regression Discontinuity Design framework.
The identiﬁcation approach we take in this paper exploits the fact that the treatment
indicator of interest attending a public college - is determined by a known discontinuous
function of an observed covariate - Senior Secondary School exit test scores. The conditional
expectation of college test scores given college type is interpreted as reﬂecting the causal
eﬀect of switching from private to public college that is induced by changes in Senior Sec-
ondary School exit test scores at the margin of admission. This interpretation is plausible
because the admission function is known to share this pattern, while it seems likely that any
other mechanism linking enrollment and test scores will be much smoother. By estimating
Equation (1) among students very close to threshold - where there is a discrete change in
college type - we can avoid the pitfalls associated with omitted student characteristics.
The students whose Senior Secondary School marks are below a distinct threshold
 ¯ S

are not eligible for admission into the public colleges. Let Ti be a binary variable with Ti = 1
indicating that the student i was admitted to a public college and 0 otherwise. Students are
admitted to public college if S > ¯ S. Therefore, Ti is expressed as:
Ti = 1
 
Si > ¯ S

, (2)
where 1(·) is an indicator function equal to one if the enclosed statement is true, and
 ¯ S

is the threshold for admission into the public college. In this set-up we are considering that
students are not randomly assigned to private and public schools, which means that is not
independent of the treatment state. Further, the disturbance term U is a combination of
the unobserved factors associated with individual’s pre-determined abilities (captured by
the class XII Senior Secondary School exam scores Si), and mean zero person-speciﬁc i.i.d
12shocks (εi):
Ui = θ(Si) + εi (3)
where θ(Si) is an unknown (to the econometrician) function of S. Hence, while we do
observe S, θ(Si) is unobserved by the econometrician. Although OLS estimates of (1) do not
have a causal interpretation, a quasi-experimental Regression-Discontinuity Design estimates
still might.
The key identiﬁcation assumption that underlies the Regression Discontinuity strategy
is that θ(Si) is a smooth (continuous) function which, at least at the margin of θ(Si),
where T switches from 0 to 1, can be approximated by a ﬂexible function of S. The causal
interpretation of RDD estimates depends on whether it is reasonable to assume that, after
accounting for the direct impact of S using a smooth function g(S), the diﬀerential beneﬁts
from public college are the only source of discontinuity in outcomes around the cutoﬀ.
If all the students admitted to a public college attend public college rather than a private
one, then Ti = Pi, and a sharp RDD would arise. In that case, the mean impact in a
neighborhood of S = S (the local average treatment eﬀect), would be identiﬁable using OLS
at this margin.
0
Yi = Xiβ + γTi + g(Si) + εi (4)
However, if a few students who are admitted to public colleges choose to attend private
colleges instead, then we will not have perfect assignment. The usual approach for dealing
with miss-assignment involves a simple form of instrumental variables analysis where the
index Ti becomes an instrumental variable for attending public college rather than a switching
treatment indicator. The RD provides a consistent estimator for the Local Average Treatment
Eﬀect. In our analysis, we also use TSLS method estimating γ based on the regression
function (1) , with the indicator Ti = 1(Si ≥ S) as the excluded instrument, and Xi and
g(Si) as a set of exogenous variables. We include ﬁxed eﬀects for the admission year (which
captures the ﬁxed eﬀect for admission cutoﬀ) in every speciﬁcation.
Using Senior Secondary School Exit Test Scores and the Admission Rules in a
Regression Discontinuity Design
The admission process provides a “natural discontinuity” in the sorting of students into
public and private colleges by high school exit exams that can be used to evaluate the causal
impact of public college education on schooling outcomes at the margin of entry. Using
the data that we assembled, we aim to evaluate the causal impact of public colleges on
13educational achievements, as measured by college exit exam, using a Regression Discontinu-
ity Design (hereafter RDD). Public colleges might not follow the formal rules. Admission
to public colleges might reﬂect networks and family connections rather than educational
achievements as measured by high school exit exams. Eligible students might choose not
to attend public colleges. For these reasons, we perform a number of robustness checks to
examine the validity of the RDD in this particular context.
Using the Regression Discontinuity Design to Account for Selection into Public
Colleges
First, we validate the use of a regression discontinuity design in this framework. We examine
whether the propensity to attend public colleges jumps from 0 to 1 at the admission cutoﬀ.
We normalize the class XII Senior Secondary School examination results as deviations from
admission cutoﬀs, which change from year to year. We look at the percentage of students
in public colleges as a function of normalized class XII (Senior Secondary School) results.
Figure II shows the regression ﬁt from linear regressions of the fraction of students in public
colleges on 4 percentage point bins of the normalized class XII scores on either side of the
cutoﬀ.25 Clearly the percentage of students attending public colleges to the left of the cutoﬀ
is almost 0. Furthermore, there is a steep jump in the percentage of students attending
public colleges at the admission cutoﬀs.26 For instance, less than 2 percents of all college
students whose high school exit score is just one bin below the cutoﬀ attend public colleges
whereas more than 95 percents of all college students whose high school exit score is just
one bin above attend public colleges. Although some who are eligible choose not to attend
public colleges and very few who did not meet the cutoﬀ attend public colleges, Figure II
clearly illustrates that admission cutoﬀ corresponds to a sharp discontinuity design.
6 Results
Before we turn to the regression analysis, we provide prima facie evidence of our main
ﬁndings. In Figure III, we graph the regression functions from local polynomial regressions
of the college outcome scores on normalized Class XII Senior Secondary Scores for public and
private colleges (a polynomial regression of degree 2 using epanechnikov kernel for smoothing
25Results are robust to this choice. We check for sensitivity to bin size and use of higher order local
polynomial regressions, and do not ﬁnd any diﬀerence. The results are Shown in Appendix Figure A.4 .
26This cutoﬀ is applicable only to students who apply for general admission, and is not applicable to those
who apply under aﬃrmative action policies. This exploratory analysis is shown for only one of the three
ﬁelds of study pooling the data for both genders and 5 years. The other ﬁelds show the same pattern.
14on either side of the admission cutoﬀ).27 We observe that this graph is very smooth and
shows no discontinuity around the cutoﬀ. Two main facts emerge: (i) public college students
perform better on exit exams than their private college counterparts and (ii) there is no
diﬀerence between the mean and dispersion of exit scores at the cutoﬀ margin.
The summary statistics (Table I) indicate that students attending public colleges come
from more aﬄuent family backgrounds than their private college counterparts and perform
better on Senior Secondary School and college exit exams. Table II reports the public-private
exit score gaps, controlling for socio-demographic indicators such as age, fathers’ occupations,
place of residence and board of education. The ﬁrst entry in Column (i) reports the average
crude public-private exit score gap. Public college students score on average about 80 points
more than their private college counterparts, which is about 0.5 of a standard deviation.
Females perform better on entry/exit exams than male students, and the fraction of females
among those who graduate from private colleges is higher. To account for the gender gap in
test scores, we next control for gender and other socio-demographic characteristics in Column
(ii). Columns (iii-a) and (iii-b) report the regression coeﬃcients on public college indicator
variable for the entire sample controlling for a rich set of demographic characteristics and
socio-economic variables. Columns (iii-a) and (iii-b) report the results separately by gender.
As columns (ii) through (iii) indicate the public-private crude score gap cannot be explained
by students’ socio-economic and demographic characteristics. We ﬁnd the adjusted gaps to
be persistently higher and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
Tables III through Table VI report our main ﬁndings. We ﬁnd that (i) public college
students have higher exit test scores than their private college counterparts, but it solely
reﬂects the diﬀerence in entry test scores; (ii) attending public college does not have any
positive impact on educational achievement, as measured by the exit test scores. The results
from the estimation of (1) are reported in Table III. In our benchmark regressions reported
in Column (i) of Panel A, attending public college seems to improve the college exit exam
outcomes by around 124.1 points, which is about 0.75 of a standard deviation. These esti-
mates are signiﬁcant at a 1 percent level, and suggest that public college students perform
better on average than the private college students. Our next step is to control for selection
into treatment by including class XII Senior Secondary School examination outcomes in the
regressions. The admissions cut-oﬀ, as noted, is based on these outcomes. Panel B of Table
III shows the results when the class XII (Senior Secondary School examination) outcomes
27This ﬁgure is not sensitive to the degree or bandwidth used. The average values of the standardized
college exit test scores in 2 percentage bins of class XII normalized Senior secondary school exam scores are
shown in Appendix Figure A.5.
15are added to the regressions.28 Accounting for entry scores, we ﬁnd the mean outcomes of
public and private schools to be statistically indistinguishable (Columns (i)-(iii)). So far we
have limited our sample to the main ﬁeld of education chosen by more than one half of our
sample. The college exit exam outcomes vary by ﬁeld. As a robustness check, we re-estimate
all our speciﬁcations from Table III pooling all the ﬁelds accounting for ﬁeld ﬁxed eﬀects.
We ﬁnd that the public-private gaps are robust to the ﬁeld of education.29
One natural concern is that students who are further from the admission cutoﬀs in either
direction are not similar in their abilities. To address this, we carry out the analysis in a
regression discontinuity framework. We narrow the window around the admission cutoﬀs
and re-estimate the eﬀect of public colleges on college exit exam outcomes. Estimates are
reported in Tables IV and V. Panel (i) of Table IV restricts the interval to 12 percentage
points of normalized Secondary School Exam scores (class XII) around the cutoﬀ. Panel
(ii) restricts the interval to 8 points around the cutoﬀ, Panel (iii) to 4 points, and ﬁnally
Panel (iv) to a 1 point window. As we shrink the interval, the exit scores of students
graduating from public and private schools turn out to be statistically indistinguishable. We
also determine the optimal bandwidth proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman(2009) and
carry out the estimation in that bandwidth. The result is shown in Panel (v). The coeﬃcient
is statistically insigniﬁcant. This is suggestive that perhaps the public-private exit score gap
is explained by pre-determined diﬀerences in students’ characteristics rather than the causal
impact of public colleges. In Table V, the corresponding panels with intervals of 12, 8, 4 and
1 points around the cutoﬀ, conﬁrm that there is no public college eﬀect when we compare the
students close to the admission cutoﬀ after correcting for selection by controlling for class
XII Senior Secondary Exam outcomes. In Panel (v), we report the regression discontinuity
design estimate using the optimal bandwidth proposed by Imbens and Kalayanaram (2009),
and ﬁnd no eﬀect. These results indicate that the private-public observed quality gap reﬂects
the sorting of better students into less expensive but more selective colleges, rather than the
causal impact of public college value added on educational outcomes.
As noted earlier, compliance with the assignment rules is not perfect. To allay concerns
about non-compliance, we use a 2SLS strategy where we instrument attendance by the
indicator for whether or not the entry score is above the admission threshold. The results
are reported in Table VI. The instrument does a very good job of predicting the assignment
28We have used a linear speciﬁcation for the control function i.e. we have included class XII Senior
Secondary School exam outcomes in the regressions. Including higher-order polynomials yields similar qual-
itative results. We also test whether dropping all control variables yield similar estimates to the estimates
reported in Table III. Results are shown in Appendix Table A.4.I and A.4.II
29Results are shown in Appendix Table A.5.
16as reported in the top Panel A.I of table VI. The second stage estimates show an even
larger public-private score gap when we do not control for pre-determined factors (Panel
A.2, Columns (i)-(iii)). Next, we repeat this exercise controlling for the class XII Senior
Secondary School exam outcomes to account for selection. The results are reported in Panel
B.I and B.2. The second stage estimates reinforce our previous ﬁndings that the public-
private college diﬀerential is on account of selection, and not value added by public colleges.
Thus far, we have looked at the eﬀect of public college attendance on educational out-
comes pooling cutoﬀs across diﬀerent admission cohorts,and gender. Next, we examine the
possibility of beneﬁts of public colleges being heterogenous across the distribution of stu-
dents. It may be possible that smarter students gain more from being in public colleges. For
instance this can be on account of teachers paying closer attention to these students. We
exploit the fact that the admission varies by year of admission, gender and stream of admis-
sion. Focussing on the main stream in the sample, we carry out the analysis restricted to
various levels of cutoﬀs. The cutoﬀs in the 5 years have signiﬁcant amount of variation and
span 30 percentage points. The results are reported in Table VII. Panel A reports the OLS
estimates of public college eﬀect across diﬀerent levels of cutoﬀs. As the cutoﬀ changes from
highest to lowest in columns (i)- (iv) of Panel A, the public college eﬀect seems to decline in
magnitude but is still strong and positive. Thus, the students with higher entry scores seem
to gain the most from public colleges. However, in Panel B, we control for the Class XII
Senior Secondary scores that determine assignment to public colleges. The public college
eﬀect becomes statistically indistinguishable from 0 across all the levels of cutoﬀ admission.
These ﬁndings suggest that the public colleges do not beneﬁt students with diﬀerent abilities
in a heterogenous way.
7 Are the Public Colleges More Cost Eﬀective?
We ﬁnd that the public-private quality diﬀerence is not on account of value-added by the
public colleges. However, public colleges could be more eﬃcient in terms of cost- eﬀective
provision. If this were the case, then public colleges would have an advantage over private
colleges. In order to address this, we collected cost data from the institutions in our sample
to compare the average cost-per-pupil in public versus private colleges. Since we do not have
a measure of the marginal cost of educating a student in a private or public college, and we
compare only average costs, this comparison is suggestive at best. The average cost-per-pupil
per annum in the private colleges in the year 2006-2007 was 13,022 Indian Rupees whereas
the average cost-per-pupil in the public colleges was 13,743 Indian Rupees. Although the
diﬀerence is not huge, private colleges have a lower cost-per-pupil than the public ones.
17Hence, it does not seem to be the case that the public colleges are more cost-eﬀective either.
8 Robustness Checks
Do observable characteristics vary at the cutoﬀ margin?
Figures IV plots the regression function from the local polynomial regression of the student’s
age on four point bins of the normalized class XII Senior Secondary School examination
scores. We also check regression functions from similar regressions of residential location,
board of class XII examinations, and father’s occupation on the 4 point bins of the normalized
scores and ﬁnd no jump in these characteristics. These are shown in Appendix tables A.6
through A.8.30 While public college students are on average (i) younger, (ii) their fathers
are less likely to be working in the agricultural sector and they (iii) are more likely to take
the ﬁnal senior Secondary school exams in the National Board of Education, we ﬁnd no
diﬀerences in all these measures at the margin of the cutoﬀ scores. Thus, none of these
variables exhibits a “discontinuity” at the admission cutoﬀ level, indicating that a RDD
is an appropriate setting for evaluating the causal impact of public college on educational
achievements in this context.31
Do Students Manipulate Behavior ?
The estimation strategy relies on the assumption that students in a narrow interval around
the admission cutoﬀ are indistinguishable in their unobserved (to the econometrician) char-
acteristics. If the students knew the rule that determined the cutoﬀ, they could manipulate
their behavior (for example, by trying to achieve higher scores in the Senior Secondary ex-
ams), and that would compromise the validity of the RD approach used here.32 In this case,
the sample of students’ right around the cutoﬀ may not be of comparable abilities.33 How-
ever, the admission cutoﬀ changed from year to year. Moreover, the rule that determined
the cutoﬀ was only known to the colleges internally. The students cannot control their entry
30Un-smoothed ﬁgures are consistent with these and are available on request.
31As detailed in Lee(2008), the continuity of the conditional expectation of the baseline characteristics
delivers the identiﬁcation of the parameter of interest.
32It is also possible that students around the cutoﬀ, who could not get admission in public colleges, exert
more eﬀort in private colleges by way of using the rejection as a motivation. Given that a two sided test for
equality of scores strongly rejects that the mean scores for public and private colleges are diﬀerent around
the cutoﬀ (diﬀerence -0.62,signiﬁcance .953 in a -4 to +4 deviation window around the cutoﬀ), it seems less
plausible that this eﬀect would be large enough to counter the positive value added eﬀect of public colleges.
33Van der Klaauw (2002) describes the threat to the validity of the RDD if the rules that determine the
cutoﬀ are known to students in the context of ﬁnancial aid decisions by colleges in USA.
18test scores perfectly as the Senior Secondary tests are evaluated in a double blind manner.
Additionally, even if they could manipulate their scores, they cannot perfectly control the
cutoﬀ. This corresponds to a case where the ’forcing variable’ is not fully in the control of
students. Hence, we think this kind of manipulation is not a threat to the identiﬁcation. Fig-
ure V suggests that there is no break in the density of the the Normalized Senior Secondary
exam (Class XII) scores which is smooth around the cutoﬀ. 34
Attrition: Can Characteristics of the Students Dropping-Out Explain the
Results?
While admission seems to be almost perfectly projected by entry rules, this does not prevent
selective dropout. Naturally we expect dropout rates to be higher among those who were not
admitted to public colleges because tuition is higher at the private colleges. If the less able
students are more likely to drop-out than the public-private exit score gap might understate
the causal impact of public college education on students’ performance. Figure VI (Panel
A and Panel B using diﬀerent bandwidths) shows that those who performed better in class
XII Senior Secondary exams, are more likely to ﬁnish college education. However, there is
no stark discontinuity in this drop-out rate around the admission cutoﬀ. We also test if the
students who drop out near the cut-oﬀ in public and private colleges are diﬀerent in their
Senior Secondary exam scores, which is a proxy for their ability coming in. We estimate
the probability of drop-out separately for public and private colleges for each gender, and
compare if the Senior Secondary exam scores diﬀerentially aﬀect dropping out probabilities
across public and private colleges. In a sample including all students, we do observe that
Senior Secondary scores have a diﬀerent impact on dropping out from public relative to
private colleges for both genders (Appendix Table A.6). Father’s occupation (government
service and business) also have a diﬀerential impact on probability to drop out. However,
when we restrict the sample to students in a -4 to +4 percentage point deviations window
from the cutoﬀ, neither the Senior Secondary scores, nor the father’s occupation diﬀerentially
eﬀect the probability of dropping out in public versus private colleges (Appendix Table
A.7). The students who drop-out from private colleges are very similar in ability and family
background to students who drop out from public colleges in the proximity of the admissions
cut-oﬀ.
34See McCrary 2008 for details on varieties of manipulation that can cause identiﬁcation problems. In
this case, sorting into diﬀerent colleges using the Senior Secondary Scores is not in perfect control of the
students, hence in this setting, the public college impact can be identiﬁed under the regularity conditions
proposed by Lee (2008).
19Attrition:Could the characteristics of the Rejected Applicants Explain the
Results?
Another related concern could be selective enrollment decisions. If student’s from relatively
poor backgrounds decide not to attend college unless they are admitted to public colleges,
then this can attenuate the impact of attending public colleges. While we do not observe
students who did not enroll, evidence suggests that this should not be of major concern, at
least at the margin of admission. The private colleges oﬀer a limited number of need- based
scholarships to those students whose performance in the class XII Senior Secondary School
exams is outstanding. Personal correspondence with senior management personnel in the
private colleges revealed that if a student at the margin is willing to pursue college education
but cannot aﬀord it, he or she is usually able to avail a need based scholarship oﬀered by
the private colleges. According to the details provided by 1 private college in our sample for
year 2006-2007, 21 students were oﬀered a 100 percent fee waiver,10 students were oﬀered
a 75 percent fee concession, and 2 students received a 50 percent fee concession.35 This
might be one of the reasons that explain why the dropout rate is smooth and continuous
around the admission cutoﬀ. Moreover, we see that right around the admission cutoﬀ, the
characteristics of those who drop out from public colleges are similar to those who drop
out from private colleges. Hence, it seems less likely that we will be missing students with
diﬀerent characteristics. If students with parents in low paying occupations did not enroll for
example, then we should expect the parents to of students in private colleges right around
the cutoﬀ to be in high paying occupations. We have ruled out this possibility by showing
that a number of students background characteristics are very smooth around the cutoﬀ.
In addition, very few individuals migrate to pursue higher education in the general sector.
We examine the reported reasons of migration by migrants in the 2001 Population Census
of India. Only 3 percent report migrating for pursuing education and this includes those
who migrate to pursue technical and professional education as well (Appendix Table A.8).
36 Hence, we think that at least at the margin of admission, selective attrition is not biasing
down our estimates.
Could Diﬀerential Peer Eﬀects explain the Diﬀerences ?
The class composition in public colleges is a mix of general category students, and students
from marginalized groups who enter public colleges because of the state reservation policy and
35There are limited number of scholarships available. As a result the students incentive to get into
subsidized public colleges is not dampened.
36Most of the migration in the age category 18-25 is reported by women on account of marriage.
20their entry scores are much lower than the entry scores of students entering public colleges in
open seats. One concern might be that the scores of the students on the margin of selection
in public colleges are negatively inﬂuenced by this ‘peer eﬀect’ 37, which could attenuate
the positive value added by public colleges. However, the students in private colleges who
are close to the margin of admission experience plausibly similar peer eﬀects. We plot the
density for Class XII scores of (i) the students graduating from public colleges who enter
on a caste based reservation seat, (ii) and the students from private colleges. We observe
that the distribution of human capital (as approximated by the Class XII Senior Secondary
Exam scores) among low scoring peers of students close to the admission cut-oﬀ in public
colleges is no diﬀerent than those in private colleges.38 Hence, it does not seem less likely
that the negative ‘peer eﬀects’ are oﬀsetting the positive public college value added eﬀect.
Similarly, a negative invidious comparison eﬀect39 that lowers the scores of students near
the cutoﬀ in public colleges is less likely due to the heterogenous composition of classes with
students admitted on reserved seats and open category seats taking the same classes. The
open category students near the cutoﬀ are in the middle of the incoming scores distribution.
Although, the college drop out rate is very high, the number of repeaters is negligible (close
to .01 percent in the sample including both open and reserved category students). Hence,
peer eﬀects from those who repeat classes (as posited by Lavy et al 2008) would not be of a
discernible signiﬁcant magnitude.
Overall, our results are supportive of a model in which teacher eﬀort is higher in the
private institutions, but this is compensated for the marginal student admitted in the public
institutions by positive peer eﬀects. In the absence of such peer eﬀects, it could be the case
that the marginal student’s outcomes in public colleges would be lower than their private
counterparts, as seen in K-12 education in India.
37We are considering the reduced form eﬀect of attending a public college. This could either be on account
of high value added or peer eﬀects. The colleges oﬀer a prescribed curriculum and there is no evidence of
academic tracking in the Indian education system. Given the mixed composition, peer eﬀects would not
necessarily have a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on the student outcomes. However, in our analysis we will only
address the overall eﬀect of students attending public colleges. A detailed analysis of ‘peer eﬀects’ on various
margins will be oﬀered in a forthcoming study.
38The densities are shown in Appendix Figure A.9.
39This eﬀect would imply that higher achieving peers depress the outcomes of lower ability students due
to lowering of morale (Hoxby and Weingarth, 2005).
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Our ﬁndings indicate that selective sorting into public colleges accounts for the public-
private college exit exam score gap. Controlling for entry scores, we ﬁnd the exit scores of
the students graduating from private and public colleges to be statistically indistinguishable.
These ﬁndings indicate that the apparent value added by public colleges reﬂects selection
of the best students into the less expensive schools rather than the causal impact of public
education on students’ performance. Our ﬁndings suggest that at the margin private colleges
are a perfect substitute to public colleges in terms of training the students. We also show
that students in the diﬀerent parts of the ability distribution do not diﬀerentially beneﬁt
from attending public college. From policy perspective, the relevant margin of analysis is
the admission cutoﬀ. It is the students at this margin who are aﬀected by public ﬁnance
decisions to expand college infrastructure.
Given that excess demand for higher education is not being met by the current infrastruc-
ture, policy makers need to determine whether to expand government college infrastructure
or to adopt other policies such as more merit-cum-need based scholarships to students in
private colleges.40 Increasing public spending on expansion of government colleges warrants
a cost-beneﬁt analysis around the cut-oﬀ of admissions. An expansion of government in-
stitutions would lower the cut-oﬀ for admission, providing free education to those who are
otherwise willing to pay for college admission. In return, if the quality of education that these
students received was higher, then a stronger case could be made to expand public tertiary
education and incur the loss of revenue. However, our results indicate that expanding public
education will not yield better trained graduates. Unless the public colleges serve other
objectives, serious consideration should be given to allowing the private sector to expand. 41
An alternative policy could be to devise scholarship programs for private colleges that
expand ﬁnancial aid to the students who cannot aﬀord a college education. The average cost-
per-pupil provides suggestive evidence that the private colleges are cheaper (to conﬁrm that
at the margin of selection, we would require information on marginal costs which we do not
have). If the share of wealthy students who would attend private colleges in absence of the
40A recent article in New Yorker reports that the salaries for skilled workers might rise by about 14
percent indicating an excess demand for skilled workers. Another article in The Economist points out that
the central government is planning to open 30 new centrally run institutions to meet the excess demand for
higher education.
41An important thing to note is that when students make college choices, they look at the outcomes of the
average students from the institutions rather than the outcome of the marginal student admitted. Hence,
they choose public colleges over private colleges due to the perception that public colleges are better. There
is an information asymmetry that inﬂuences the college decisions.
22public subsidy, among the students who actually receive scholarships is not too large, then
a modest diﬀerence in costs can make this policy more appealing.42 When these alternate
policies are feasible, the state can extend its role in monitoring the standards of education
oﬀered by the colleges, and encouraging the development of a market based tertiary education
sector.
Our paper examines how public colleges aﬀect quality of human capital acquired in
colleges. As indicated by a large body of literature, there can be signiﬁcant returns in the
labor markets from attending selective and prestigious institutions. As mentioned before,
this can be on account of value added by the colleges, networking, or on account of screening
by the employers when there is information asymmetry about ability of the employees (Epple
and Romano (1998); Macleod and Urquiola (2009)). Analyzing whether there are signiﬁcant
positive returns to attending public colleges in labor market and if so, what explains them
is an important avenue of future research.
42Let C1 be the MC of educating a student in a public college and C0 be the MC of educating the student
in the private college at the cutoﬀ for admission. Suppose P is the fraction of additional students who receive
the scholarship instead of attending public colleges.Then the beneﬁt of the scholarship program would be
(C1 −C0)P and the cost of this program will be (1−P)C1. The cost results from the use of this subsidy by
some students who aﬀord private college fee and would have paid it in absence of the subsidy. Therefore, if
1 − C0
C1 > 1
P − 1, then this policy would be cost eﬀective.
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Figure I : Panel  A and B show the college exit exam scores for liberal arts stream for men and women respectively. Difference between public 
and private college outcomes is statistically significant at 1 percent for all years for men and women (except for men in 1998). 
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            Figure II:  This Figure graphs the regression functions from a linear regression of percentage of students in public colleges on the  
            4 point intervals of Normalized Class XII Senior Secondary Scores on either side of the admission cutoff. Class XII Percentage                
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Figure III: This figure graphs the regression functions from a local polynomial regression of marks obtained in the exit exams of the 
undergraduate degree in liberal arts for students in private(to the left of 0) and public (to the right of 0) colleges on their normalized class 
XII Senior Secondary School Exam Percentage. Class XII percentage pins down the entry score rank and has been normalized by 
subtracting admission cutoff from the actual score. The regressions use epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of 2, and a polynomial of 
degree 2. 
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Figure IV: This figure graphs the regression function from a polynomial regression of the average age of students on 4 point intervals of 
normalized class XII Senior Secondary Exam percentage score. Class XII Percentage pins down the entry score rank and has been 
normalized by subtracting admission cutoff from the actual score. The regressions use epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of 2, and a 
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                                                Density of the class XII Senior Secondary School exam normalized scores  
                                           (Histogram bin size 0.5, smoothed kernel density using epanechnikov kernel) 
 
                             Figure V:  This figure shows that the density of the selection variable is smooth around the cutoff     
31                              Panel A: Bandwidth 2 
 
 
                         Panel B: Bandwidth 4                       
 
 Figure VI: This figure graphs the regression function from a polynomial regression of the percentage of 
students dropping-out of college on 4 point intervals of normalized class XII Senior Secondary Exam 
percentage score. The regressions use epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of 2. Dropping-out rate is 
very smooth around the admission cutoff. In Panel A, a bandwidth of 2 is used, while a bandwidth of 4 is 
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32Table I:  Summary Statistics by College Type
Private Public Difference
Fraction Males 0.198 0.477
Variables
Age 17.99 17.95 0.04
(.014) (.015) (.02)
School Board in 
Class XII
Regional 0.78 0.63 0.15
(.007) (.01) (.01)
Central 0.2 0.36 -0.155
(.007) (.01) (.011)
Rural Residence 0.124 0.086 0.038
(.006) (.006) (.0094)
Father's Occupation
Agriculture 0.092 0.065 0.026
(.005) (.005) (.007)
Business 0.42 0.37 0.05
(.0087) (.01) (.013)
Government Employee 0.07 0.08 -0.008
(.004) (.005) (.007)
Labor 0.032 0.039 -0.007
(.003) (.004) (.005)
Professional 0.054 0.041 0.012
(.004) (.004) (.006)








Liberal Arts 1378.73 1461.08 -82.35
(3.43) (4.58) (5.6)
33   Table II: OLS Estimates  of the Effect of Public Colleges on Educational Outcomes
            Dependent Variable : Final Marks in Undergraduate Degree 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iii-a) (iii-b)
All Males Females
Public  College 82.34 131.3 124.14 97.96 133.14
(5.6) (5.7) (6.2) (11.7) (7.3)
Controls
Age -4.76 -26.56 -8.1 207.19
(3.07) (42.8) (54) (106.97)




Rural -29.17 -29.68 -26.7 -32.27
(7.8) (9.3) (15) (11.8)
Father's Occupation
Agriculture 7.8 -16.27 41.7
(15.3) (22.1) (21.28)
Business 10.4 -17.9 41.98
(13.1) (19) (18.4)
Professional 27 -34 58.53
(17.6) (49.2) (22)
Private Service -4.1 -27.7 27.18
(13.3) (18.4) (18.9)
Government Service -19.4 -19 6.52
(15.8) (24.5) (21.32)
Regional Class XII -30.12 -29.7 -26.48
Board (8.5) (17.2) (9.86)
Obervations 3394 2742 2612 662 1950
F 215.56 290.57 83.72 9.71 43.51
R-Squared 0.06 0.3 0.3 0.16 0.22
Notes:   Columns (i) - (iii)  report the results  from linear regressions estimating the effect of attending
public college on educational outcomes. Final marks in undergraduate degree are the composite overall
the composite overall scores of the students in liberal  arts streams. Public college is an indicator variable
equal to 1 if the student attends public college. Column (ii) and (iii) control for the observable student
 characteristics including age, gender, and rural residence status. Column (iii) also controls for square of
age, father's occupation type, the board of education in class XII (Senior Secondary Board), and year of
admission (not reported). Excluded category for father's occupation is `labor'. Professional includes
 doctors,lawyers, accountants, jounalists, and professors. Columns (iii-a) and (iii-b) report the regression
 estimates by gender. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
34                        Accounting for Selection : Controlling for the Class XII (Senior Secondary) Exit Exams Scores
          Table III: OLS Estimates of the Effect of Public Colleges on Educational Outcomes
                                 Dependent Variable : Final Marks in Undergraduate Degree 
Panel (A) Panel (B)
(i) (ii) (iii) (i) (ii) (iii)
ALL Males Females ALL Males Females
Public  College 124.1 97.96 133.14 1.28 -1.57 1.72
(6.2) (11.7) (7.3) (8.06) (16.63) (9.44)
Class XII  Percentage 8.8 7.87 9.03
(Senior Secondary) (.409) (.97) (.45)
Obervations 2612 662 1950 2612 662 1950
F 83.72 9.71 43.51 122.93 14.56 76.53
R-Squared 0.31 0.16 0.22 0.41 0.22 0.35
Notes:    Panels (A) - (B)  report the results  from linear regressions estimating the effect of  attending public college on educational
 outcomes. Final marks in undergraduate degree are the  composite overall scores of the students in liberal arts streams.
 Public college is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the student attends public college and 0 otherwise. Panel (A) shows the results
 from the benchmark regressions (also reported in Table I: Column (iii)). Panel (B) reports the results from the linear regressions
 that control for the percentage of marks scored in Class XII senior secondary exams which form the basis of  selection into Public
Colleges.  Each regression also controls for observable student characteristics including age, age squared, gender,rural residence 
 status,father's occupation,board of education in Class XII (Senior Secondary board), and  year of  admission(not reported).
 Excluded category for father's occupation is 'Labor'. Sample used is the 'Non Reserved Graduating Sample'  as described in the 
 Data Appendix.  The results are reported separately for Males and Females in columns (ii) and (iii) of each panel. Robust standard
 errors are reported in parentheses. 
35                      Regression Discontinuity Design Framework
                   Table IV:The Effect of Attending Public Colleges on Educational Outcomes 
                                                Dependent Variable : Final Marks in Undergraduate Degree 
Optimal
 Bandwidth
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
1 23 1 23 1 23 1 23width
ALL Males Females ALL Males Females ALL Males Females ALL Males Females 0.921
Public 90.66 79.4 93 66.9 65.11 67.2 35.5 41.1 32.2 14.47 42.33 -0.34 16.76
College (6.51) (12.66) (7.76) (7.38) (14.84) (8.68) (9.8) (19.69) (11.87) (19.88) (36) (26.19) (24.21)
Obervations 1978 577 1401 1499 465 1034 847 279 568 308 135 173 235
F 73.19 6.83 19.66 62.9 5.6 10.08 43.83 2.73 4.61 16.31 0.83 1.73 11.51
R-Squared 0.34 0.13 0.15 0.3 0.14 0.1 0.4 0.11 0.09 0.41 0.08 0.12 0.42
12 points window 8 points window 4 points window 1 point window
Notes: Panels (i)-(iv) report the results  from linear regressions estimating the effect of  attending public college on educational outcomes. 
Final marks in undergraduate degree are the  composite overall scores of the students in liberal arts streams. Public College is a binary variable
 that equals 1 if the student attended public collge and 0 otherwise. Panel (i) reports the results for a sample restricted to 12 points window
 above and below the cutoff. The sample is restricted to a smaller window of 8 points around the cutoff in Panel (ii). In Panel (iii), the window 
is shrunk to 4 points above and below the cutoff and in Panel (iv),we report the results from a sample restricted to 1 point window around the
 cutoff. Each regression also controls for observable student characteristics including age, age squared,  gender, rural residence status, father's
 occupation,board of education in Class XII (Senior Secondary board),   year of  admission, and the concentration stream (not reported). 
Excluded category for father's  occupation is 'Labor'.  Sample used is the 'Non Reserved Graduating Sample' as described in the Data Appendix.
 Results are reported separately for Males and Females in Columns 2 and 3 of each Panel. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Panel V reports the results using optimal bandwidth.
36Accounting for Selection in the Regression Discontinuity Design Framework
             Controlling for the Class XII (Senior Secondary) Exit Exams Scores
                          Table V: The Effect of Attending Public Colleges on Educational Outcomes
                                                       Dependent Variable : Final Marks in Undergraduate Degree 
Optimal
 Bandwidth
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
1 2 31 2 31 2 31 2 3 Width
ALL Males Females ALL Males Females ALL Males Females ALL Males Females 0.921
Public -7.14 -6.87 -10.51 -8.3 -10.7 -11.75 8.23 27.3 -5.48 7.76 38.03 -10.27 5.74
College (9.93) (17.96) (11.84) (10.78) (19.84) (13.46) (13.46) (24.6) (17.9) (20.91) (39.94) (30.6) (24.71)
Class XII % 10.3 9.14 10.34 10.7 11.4 10.92 7.5 4.53 10.23 7.86 6.84 13.83 19
(Senior (.84) (1.39) (.92) (1.14) (2.06) (1.44) (2.5) (4.87) (3.64) (7.64) (27.41) (22.01) (9.7)
Secondary)
Obervations 1978 577 1401 1499 465 1034 847 279 568 308 135 173 235
F 85.21 9.89 28.4 67.9 7.74 13.93 41.86 2.59 4.89 16.31 0.83 1.73 11.13
R-Squared 0.4 0.2 0.22 0.4 0.12 0.16 0.43 0.12 0.11 0.41 0.08 0.12 0.43
12 points window 8 points window 4 points window 1 points window
Notes: Panels (i)-(iv) report the results  from linear regressions estimating the effect of  attending public college on educational outcomes. 
Final marks in undergraduate degree are the  composite overall scores of the students in liberal arts streams. Public College is a binary variable
 that equals 1 if the student attended public collge and 0 otherwise. Panel (i) reports the results for a sample restricted to 12 points window
 above and below the cutoff. The sample is restricted to a smaller window of 8 points around the cutoff in Panel (ii). In Panel (iii), the window 
is shrunk to 4 points above and below the cutoff and in Panel (iv),we report the results from a sample restricted to 1 point window around the
 cutoff. Each set of  regressions  control for the percentage of marks scored in Class XII Senior Secondary exams which form the basis of 
selection into Public Colleges. Each regression also controls for observable student characteristics including age, age squared,  gender,
 rural residence status, father's  occupation,board of education in Class XII (Senior Secondary board), year of  admission, and the concentration
 stream (not reported). Excluded category for father's  occupation is 'Labor'.  Sample used is the 'Non Reserved Graduating Sample' as 
  described in the Data Appendix. Results are reported separately for Males and Females in Columns 2 and 3 of each Panel .  Robust standard 
 errors are reported in parentheses. Panel V reports results using optimal bandwidth.
37        Table VI :Two Stage Least Square Estimates of the Effect of Public Colleges on Educational Outcomes
                             First Stage Instrumental Variable Estimates
                                                        Dependent Variable : Indicator for Public College Attendence
Panel A.1 Panel B.1
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
ALL Males Females ALL Males Females
Indicator for Eligibility 0.89 0.93 0.856 0.827 0.85 0.805
(.008) (.018) (.001) (.013) (.03) (.015)
Class XII  Percentage No No No Yes Yes Yes
Obervations 2612 662 1950 2612 662 1950
F 986.58 215.34 682.24 930.9 203.8 641.12
R-Squared 0.84 0.812 0.82 0.84 0.81 0.82
            Second-Stage Instrumental Variable Estimates of Public College Attendence on Educational Outcomes
                                                       Dependent Variable : Final Marks in Undergraduate Degree 
Panel A.2 Panel B.2
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
ALL Males Females ALL Males Females
Predicted Public  College 153.56 117.59 164.92 11.76 -0.15 13.21
Attendence (6.81) (12.9) (8.11) (10.45) (22.23) (12.23)
Class XII  Percentage No No No Yes Yes Yes
Obervations 2612 662 1950 2612 662 1950
F 93.15 10.7 50.84 123.08 14.56 76.6
R-Squared 0.33 0.176 0.2545 0.415 0.24 0.35
Notes:    Panels (A) - (B)  report the two stage least square estimates of the effect of  attending public college on educational outcomes.  The top panel
 reports the first stage results from a linear regression where the indicator for eligibility is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the Class XII percentage score
of the student exceeds the Public College admission cutoff . The bottom panel reports the results from the second stage. Final marks in undergraduate
 degree are the  composite overall scores of the student in the liberal arts streams. Panel (B) controls for the the precentage marks scored in Class XII
 (Senior Secondary exams) which form the basis of  selection into Public Colleges while Panel (A) doe not. Public College is an indicator variable equal
 to 1 if the student attends public college . Each set of regressions also controls for observable student characteristics including age, age squared, 
 gender, rural residence status,father's occupation,board of education in Class XII, and  year of admission (not reported). Excluded category  for father's
 occupation is 'Labor'. Sample used is  the 'Non Reserved Graduating Sample' as described in the Data Appendix.  The results are reported separately
 for Males and Females in columns (ii) and (iii) of each panel. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
38Robustness Check: Testing for Heterogeous Effect by Distribution of Admission Cut-off Scores
TableVII: OLS Estimates of the Effect of Public Colleges on Educational Outcomes by Distribution of Admission Cutoff Scores
                                                         Dependent Variable : Final Marks in Undergraduate Degree 
Panel A Panel (B)                 Panel A Panel (B)
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Cutoff Admission Highest Lowest Highest Lowest
Public  College 146.65 129.78 101.87 90 17.16 -3.8 3.08 -8.2
(15.2) (8.4) (14.8) (18.64) (19.07) (10.9) (21.11) (26.6)
Class XII  Percentage No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Senior Secondary)
Obervations 479 1471 458 204 479 1471 458 204
F 13.33 36.74 6.93 5.43 23.47 64.05 10.02 7.71
R-Squared 0.22 0.23 0.15 0.21 0.35 0.37 0.23 0.3
Notes: Panels (A) - (B)  report the results  from linear regressions estimating the effect of  attending public college on educational outcomes. Columns (i)
 to (iv) restrict  the sample to specific cutoffs that vary by year and gender. Final marks in undergraduate degree are the  composite overall scores of the 
 students in liberal arts  stream. Public college is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the student attends public college and 0 otherwise. Panel (A) shows th
 results from the  regressions restricting the admission cutoffs to different values ranging from low to high. Panel (B) reports the results from the linear 
regressions that control for the percentage of marks scored in Class XII senior secondary exams which form the basis of  selection into Public Colleges. 
E h i l t l f b bl t d t h t i ti i l di d l id t f th ' ti Each regression also controls for observable student characteristics including age, age squared, rural residence stau, father's occupation, 
board of education in Class XII (Senior  Secondary board). Excluded category for father's occupation is 'Labor'. Sample used is the 'Non Reserved 
Graduating Sample'  as described in the Data Appendix. Robust Standard Errors are reported in paranthesis.
39Appendices
Data Appendix: Data Collection and Formation of Samples
We obtained the admission records for students who applied to study liberal arts, commerce or science
streams. We obtained the admission data for 15783 students. Out of these,7467 students were admitted
in public colleges and 8316 were admitted in private colleges. These included 7983 women and 7796 men.
65 percent of the students took admission in humanities and social sciences, 20 percent in science and 15
percent in commerce. While these colleges have signiﬁcant autonomy in determining the incoming class size
for social sciences and humanities stream, the number of seats in commerce and science are capped by the
university that these colleges are aﬃliated to. Usually the available seats are in multiples of 70 and the
decision is based on the college infrastructure and demand for the stream.
The dropout rate is around 45% and the sample appearing for ﬁnal year exams includes 8775 students.
The dropout rate is similar across private and public colleges. The retention rate of public colleges is 58%
and that of private colleges is 53%. Across the streams, retention rate is highest for commerce (66 per-
cent), followed by social sciences and humanities (56 percent) and sciences have the lowest retention rate
(44 percent). The graduating students in the non reserved category comprise our main sample used in the
analysis(henceforth non reserved graduating sample).
Speciﬁc percentage of seats in the public colleges are reserved for scheduled classes under aﬃrmative
action policy of the state. Additional reservations are made for backward classes, children of deceased armed
force personnel who die in active duty or freedom ﬁghters, riot victims, immigrants from Kashmir which
is a disturbed area in the northern part of Indian subcontinent, teachers wards and athletes. We exclude
the admissions based on reserved seats from our sample. We observe the result status of everyone in the
graduating class. However, the ﬁnal composite score is not reported for some students whose result is late on
account of administrative reasons. The scores of these students are notiﬁed by the university later through
college notiﬁcations. We exclude these from our sample. In addition, we exclude cases where either the
senior secondary marks or ﬁnal composite marks are missing. We also exclude reappearing students and
students who remained absent from the ﬁnal year exams. Finally, we trim the cases where the students failed
in the ﬁnal exams as the percentage of these cases is small and is not systematically diﬀerent across private
and public colleges. Table A.1.a summarizes these exclusions. In Table A.1.b, we show that the number of
excluded observations are not systematically diﬀerent across private or public colleges for any category of
excluded observations. Table A.3 shows number of observations by variables.
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Figure A.1: This figure shows the density of salaries (in ‘000 of Indian Rupees) by public and 

























 Privates in Sample  Other Privates in Neighboring District
 
Figure A.2 This figure shows the density of college exit scores for the in-sample private colleges 
compared to other private colleges in the same district (left panel) and private colleges in the 
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Figure A.3 This figure shows the density of college exit scores for the in-sample public colleges 
compared to other private colleges in the  neighboring district  for the  academic year 2009-2010. 
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                           Sensitivity Check -  Changing Bin Size to 2 Percentage Point Windows
 Discontinuity in Public College Attendence
 
Figure A.4: This figure plots the regression functions from a polynomial regression in Panel A and a 
linear regression in Panel B of the percentage of students attending public colleges on the bins of 
normalized class XII Senior secondary school percentage score.  The bin size in Panel A is 4 percentage 
points but the functions are based on a degree 2 polynomial local regression on either side of the 
admission cutoff. Panel B depicts a linear fit but the bin size is 2 percentage points. 
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Figure A.5: This figure shows the average values of standardized college exit test scores in 2 percentage 
point bins of normalized class XII Senior secondary school percentage scores.  
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Figure A.6: This figure graphs the regression function from a polynomial regression of the percentage of 
students from rural areas on 4 point intervals of normalized class XII Senior Secondary Exam percentage 
score. The regressions use epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of 2, and a polynomial of degree 2.      









































-40 -20 0 20
 Normalised Senior Secondary School Score Bins 
 Class XII Exam Board
 
Figure A.7: This figure graphs the regression function from a polynomial regression of the percentage of 
students from regional school board on 4 point intervals of normalized class XII Senior Secondary Exam 






































































                        Percentage of Students by Father’s Occupation  
Figure A.8: This Figure graphs the percentage of students in 4 point intervals of Normalized Class XII 
Percentage by Father’s occupation. Class XII Percentage pins down the entry score rank and has been 
normalized by subtracting admission cutoff from the actual score. In each Panel, Y Axis represents 
Percentage of Students with particular Father’s occupation. Normalized Class XII scores are along X axis.                    
45 
Panel A: Kernel Density of Class XII Senior Secondary Exam Scores for students in Public colleges who 



















































 Marginalized groups in Public  Private
 
Panel B: Kernel Density of Class XII Senior Secondary Exam Scores for students in Public colleges who 
















































 Reserved Categories in Public  Private
 
 Figure A.9:  Densities of Class XII Senior Secondary Exam Scores for students in public colleges 
entering through reservation policy compared to the students in private colleges. 




Number % of Total
All Observations --- --- 15783
1) Drop Outs 7008 44.4 8775
Excluding: 
2) Pass but missing Senior Secondary  marks 152 1.7 8623
3) Pass but missing Final composite score 25 0.28 8598
4) Late Score Notification 301 3.4 8297
5) Absent or reappear 1110 12.6 7187
6) Fail  202 2.3 6985
7) Admitted on Reserved category seat  1339 15.2 5646
7) Total main sample 6985
8) Total non reserved category main sample 5646
47Table A.1.b
Excluded Observations by Type of College
Pivate Public
Total 4418 4357
Excluded % of total Excluded % of total
 Pass but missing Senior Secondary  marks 120 2.7 32 0.7
 Pass but missing Final composite score 16 0.3 9 0.2
 Late Score Notification 123 2.7 178 4
 Absent or reappear 563 12.7 547 12.5
Fail 94 2.12 108 2.4
48Table A.2:  Observations by Variables in the Non Reserved Graduating Sample





Board in Senior Secondary 5603 99.20
Stream of Study in Senior Secondary 5646 100.00
Medium of Instruction in Senior Secondary  2761 48.90
Marks obtained in Senior Secondary  exams 5646 100.00
Rural/Urban Residence Indicator ++ 4586 81.20
Father's Occupation 5009 88.70
Father's Income @ 3496 62.00
Admission Year 5646 100.00
Final composite Marks in University Exams 5646 100.00
Result Status 5646 100.00
Stream of study in College 5646 100.00
++ Rural/Urban indicator was not reported for 1998-99
@ Women Public College does not record father's income
49Table A.3: Summary Statistics 
Proportion Mean Std. Dev.
Gender 
Male 0.313 --- ---
Residence Indicator
Rural 0.11 --- ---
Father's Occupation
Agriculture 0.089 --- ---
Business 0.437 --- ---
Govt. Employee 0.083 --- ---
Labor 0.038 --- ---
Professional 0.053
Service 0.297 --- ---
Senior Secondary
Board 
PSEB 0.72 --- ---
Percentage Marks
Arts --- 63.42 9.4
Commerce --- 74.34 7.95
Science --- 64.4 8.41
Age --- 17.97 0.809
Final Composite Marks
Liberal Arts --- 1413 166.46
Commerce --- 899.62 99.7
Science --- 1289.6 168.6
50                  Robustness Check: Including different functional forms of the control function
                    Table A.4.I: Effect of Public Colleges on Educational Outcomes
                              Dependent Variable : Final Marks in Undergraduate Degree for Liberal Arts
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Public  College 1.28 -5.1 -6.25 -36.97
(8.06) (8.36) (8.38) (55.45)
Class XII  Percentage Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sqaured Class XII Percentage Yes Yes
Class XII Percentage Cube Yes
Public* Class XII Percentage Yes
Obervations 2612 2616 2616 2616
F 122.93 116.07 109.58 115.26
R-Squared 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41
Notes:  Sample used is the 'Non Reserved Graduating Sample' as described in the Data Appendix.
Public College is a binary variable that equals 1 if the student attended public collge.
In addition to the variables shown, each regression controls for age,  age squared, father's occupation
board in Class XII , rural /urban residence status,  and year of admission.
51Robustness Check: Dropping Controls
Table A.4.II : Effect of Public Colleges on Educational Outcomes
                                       Dependent Variable : Final Marks in Undergraduate Degree for Liberal Arts
  12 point window     8 point window 4  point window  1 point window
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
Public Attendence 79.87 97.03 66 67.76 38.5 35 39.6 -3.73
(12.4) (7.36) (14.54) (8.38) (18.9) (11.3) (32) (24.29)
Obervations 577 1402 465 1035 279 569 135 174
F 20.15 54.4 16.09 23.66 6.97 8.12 1.96 2.1
R-Squared 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.04
Notes:  Sample used is the 'Non Reserved Graduating Sample' as described in the Data Appendix
Public College is a binary variable that equals 1 if the student attended public collge.
Each Regression Controls for the year of admission.
52Robustness Check : Estimates from a sample pooling all streams of education with stream fixed effects 
Table A.5 : OLS  Estimates of the Effect of Public Colleges on Educational Outcomes
                                               Dependent Variable : Final Marks in Undergraduate Degree 
Panel (A) Panel (B)
ALL Males Females ALL Males Females
Public  College 113.71 91.67 125.58 -0.32 -6.49 6.8
(4.88) (9.53) (5.72) (6.04) (12.3) (7.02)
Class XII  Percentage 9.22 8.6 9.24
(Senior Secondary) (.33) (.74) (.367)
Obervations 4087 997 3090 4087 997 3090
F 665.79 142.91 549.53 793.6 160.75 660.81
R-Squared 0.72 0.68 0.72 0.76 0.72 0.775
Notes:    Panels (A) - (B)  report the results  from linear regressions estimating the effect of  attending public college on educational
 outcomes. Final marks in undergraduate degree are the  composite overall scores of the students in a pooled sample of all streams
 Public college is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the student attends public college and 0 otherwise. Panel (A) shows the results
 from the benchmark regressions ( Table I: Column (iii) reports these for 1 stream). Panel (B) reports the results from the regressions
 that control for the percentage of marks scored in Class XII senior secondary exams which form the basis of selection into Public
 Colleges.  Each regression also controls for observable student characteristics including age, age squared, gender, rural residence
 status,father's occupation,board of education in Class XII (Senior Secondary board),   year of  admission, and the concentration
 stream (not reported). Excluded category for father's occupation is 'Labor'. Professional Includes doctors, lawyers,accountants,
 journalists, and professors. Sample used is the 'Non Reserved Graduating Sample' as described in the Data Appendix. Robust 
 standard errors are reported in parentheses. The results are reported separately for Males and Females in columns (ii) and (iii) 
 of each panel.  
53 Table A.6:   Probit Estimates of Probability of Dropping out ‐Entire Sample
                    Men  Chow Test                    Women Chow Test
Public Private  Stat Significance Public Private  Stat Significance
Senior Secondary  ‐0.019 ‐0.035 3.28 0.07 0.009 ‐0.02 8.97 0.002
Score (.007) (.005) (.01) (.003)
Father's  Occupation
Government Service 0.2 0.187 0 0.94 0.2 ‐0.23 2.93 0.08
(.15) (.182) (2) (.13)
Professional 0.12 ‐0.03 0.16 0.68 0.1 ‐0.17 1.17 0.28
(.24) (.28) (.2) (.14)
Service 0.047 ‐0.006 0.12 0.72 0.3 ‐0.26 2 0.15
(.12) (.09) (.17) (.11)
Agriculture 0.21 0.23 0.02 0.88 0.23 0.009 0.75 0.38
(.13) (.10) (.2) (.12)
Business 0.1 0.02 0.19 0.66 0.1 ‐0.35 5.53 0.01
(.125) (.1) (.16) (.112)
Regional Borad ‐0.0031964 ‐0.006 0 0.98 ‐0.03 ‐0.25 2.54 0.11
(.12) (.14) (.09) (.09)
Rural 0.0001629 ‐0.000057 2.17 0.14 0.0005 0.0002 8.13 0.004
(0.00009) (.0001) (.0001) (.00005)
Age 0.132 0.09 0.83 0.36 0.09 0.14 0.54 0.46
(.03) (.03) (.06) (.02)
Observations 1757 3142 1102 3141
Notes: The first 2 columns in each panel report results from a separate probit regression of drop-out probablity  restricted to public and private 
 colleges respectively. Panel (i) reports the results for Men and (ii) for Women colleges. The results from the  test of equivalence of coefficients  
 (Chow test) are reported in next 2 columns with test statistic in the third column and significance level in the fourth coulmn. Excluded category 
 for father's occupation  is 'Labor'. Sample used is the 'Non Reserved Graduating Sample'  as described in the 'Data Appendix'.
54             Table A.7: Probit Estimates of Probability of Dropping out ‐ Sample  Restricted  to ‐4 to + 4  Point Window Around 
                               Admission Cutoff
                    Men  Chow Test                    Women Chow Test
Public Private  Stat Significance Public Private  Stat Significance
Senior Secondary ‐ 0.044 ‐0.043 0 0.97 ‐0.005 0.003 0.02 0.88
Scores (.03) (.03) (.04) 0.04
Father's  Occupation
Government Service ‐0.05 ‐0.04 0 0.99 ‐0.23 ‐0.2 0 0.96
(.2) (.46) (.33) (.47)
Professional 0.56 0.64 0.01 0.91 ‐0.21 ‐0.31 0.03 0.86
(.44) (.68) (.36) (.48)
Service ‐0.28 0.18 2.72 0.1 ‐0.1 ‐0.1 0 0.97
(.17) (.22) (.25) (.45)
Agriculture ‐0.04 0.3 1.2 0.27 0.05 ‐0.57 1.18 0.27
0.188 (.25) (0.32) (.47)
Business ‐0.12 0.03 0.25 0.61 0.12 ‐0.61 2.15 0.14
(.17) (.24) (.24) (.43)
Regional Board 0.22 ‐0.0003 0.32 0.57 0.14 ‐0.4 5.13 0.02
(.25) (.3) (.15) (.17)
Rural 0.0002 ‐0.0002 2.06 0.15 0.0004 0.003 0.34 0.56
(.0001) (.0002) 0.0001 (.0001)
Age 0.12 0.1 0.03 0.86 0.02 0.24 3.53 0.06
(.05) (.07) (.08) (.07)
Observations 633 289 476 491
Notes: The first 2 columns in each panel report results from a separate probit regression of drop-out probablity  restricted to public and private 
 colleges respectively. Panel (i) reports the results for Men and (ii) for Women colleges. The results from the  test of equivalence of coefficients  
 (Chow test) are reported in next 2 columns with test statistic in the third column and significance level in the fourth coulmn. Excluded category 
 for father's occupation  is 'Labor'. Sample used is the 'Non Reserved Graduating Sample'  as described in the 'Data Appendix'.
55                      Table A.8:  Reasons for  Migration of Migrants by Last Residence  ‐Duration (0‐9 years) 
 Persons   Total Males Females
 Total migrants    98,301,342    32,896,986    65,404,356  
 Reason for migration:       
 Work/Employment   14.7    37.6   3.2  
 Business   1.2    2.9   0.3  
 Education   3.0    6.2   1.3  
 Marriage   43.8    2.1   64.9  
 Moved after birth   6.7    10.4   4.8  
 Moved with households   21.0    25.1   18.9  
 Other   9.7    15.7   6.7  
56